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This paper develops and tests a model of growth that emphasizes 
the introduction of new exports as the main source of growth in countries 
that are well within the global technology frontier and depend for growth 
on adapting existing products to their economic environment. It seeks to 
capture the stylized facts behind growth in countries as different as the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, Mauritius, Finland, China 
and Chile, all of which have relied on export diversification. The widening 
of comparative advantage is thus seen as the main driver of economic 
growth. The export diversification hypothesis is tested using an empirical 
growth model. Controlling for other variables that affect growth, export 
diversification —both alone and in interaction with growth in per capita 
export volumes— is found to be highly significant in explaining per capita 
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This paper explores the connection between rising 
exports and gdp growth, with reference to the 
divergent growth experience of East Asian and Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. We are interested 
in the issue of whether export growth is associated 
with overall economic growth. In a statistical sense 
the relationship must hold, since exports are a part 
of gdp, but the focus here will be on whether there 
is a particular kind of export growth that can result 
in sustained growth both in exports and in gdp. We 
posit that countries with diversified export structures 
are able to record consistently higher export growth 
than countries whose exports are largely confined to 
just a few products.
Section II presents some analytical considerations 
on the question of why output and export diversification 
should be positive for growth. In section III, a 
model is developed to capture the stylized facts of 
an economy where growth is based on adaptation 
of foreign goods rather than on genuine innovation. 
After looking at the export and growth experience of 
Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia (section 
IV), we show the plausibility of a negative association 
between export concentration and growth owing to 
the effects of  concentration on export and output 
volatility (section V). Then, in section VI, we show 
that an export diversification index and export growth 
interacting with this index (a sort of  diversification-
weighted export growth rate) are strong explanatory 
variables in a simple empirical growth model estimated 
with cross-section data for 1980-2003. In section VII, 
the coefficients yielded by the empirical model are 
used to estimate the average contribution of export 
diversification, investment and the rule of  law to 






Why might export diversification be beneficial to 
growth? There are potentially two different types of 
effects. The first is what we call the portfolio effect, which 
takes its name from the financial literature. The greater 
the degree of diversification, the less volatile export 
earnings will be. Less volatile exports are associated 
with lower variance of gdp growth. This in itself  is a 
positive aspect of diversification, since countries with 
imperfect (or no) access to world financial markets 
will not be able to smooth consumption in the face 
of large fluctuations in exports and output. 
In addition, the variance and mean of the growth 
rate may be negatively correlated for other reasons. 
This adverse effect of  volatility on average growth 
could result from hysteresis. Periods of contraction 
lead to the destruction of installed capacity and to 
deskilling of the labour force, neither of which can 
easily be undone during the next boom. Also, countries 
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whose exports are highly dependent on one or a few 
products tend to have more volatile real exchange rates 
than countries with diversified export structures, and 
real exchange-rate volatility discourages investment 
in tradable goods and services.
Second, there is the dynamic effect of  export 
diversification. Long-run growth is associated with 
learning to produce an expanding range of goods. 
This view sees growth as resulting from the addition 
of new products to the export and production basket. 
In countries that have few indigenous sources of 
productivity growth, most productivity advances come 
from the investment process itself, as new capital goods 
embody changes in production methods and open up 
new sectors that have higher factor productivity than 
existing ones. These sectors are not new to the world, 
but they are new to the economy where they are being 
introduced and represent technical change.
One of the single most important characteristics 
of countries with low per capita income is that they 
have a comparative advantage in a very limited range 
of goods. In other words, paucity of skills or a lack 
of complementary inputs (some non-traded) mean 
that these countries are unable to apply production 
knowledge that exists elsewhere in the world. As 
a country develops, it becomes increasingly able 
to produce an ever wider range of  goods and can 
begin to compete in international markets for them. 
Consequently, there is a line of causation that runs 
from per capita income to diversification of production 
and exports. While not the only one, the ability to 
export can certainly be judged a good indicator of 
international competitiveness. 
But there may also be a causal relationship running 
from efforts to diversify exports to growth itself. The 
acquisition of new comparative advantages may be a 
powerful spur to more rapid economic growth. In other 
words, countries whose comparative advantages remain 
confined to a narrow range of low-technology goods 
grow slowly, and countries that are able to broaden 
their comparative advantages grow more rapidly. That 
is the major hypothesis of this paper.
Production of goods that represent a step up the 
technological ladder for a country requires trained 
labour, but the introduction of such goods also speeds 
up the training of workers, as those employed in the 
new ventures tend to train others. In addition, the 
introduction of a new type of production increases 
the likelihood that other new sectors will arise, as 
human capital employed in the new sector may well 
come up with new production ideas. 
In some recent literature, it has been convincingly 
argued that producers do not have complete knowledge 
of the comparative advantages of their economies. 
There are elements of comparative advantage that are, 
so to speak, discovered in the process of producing a 
new good. On this view, introducing a new good to the 
export basket has an externality, because it reveals to 
other producers the underlying cost structure of the 
economy. However, in a developing-country context, 
the introduction of a new good or the application 
of a new technology is easily copied, because such 
technological innovations cannot be patented in the 
economy where they are introduced. Therefore, the 
leader will not reap all the benefits of his investment 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003).
A similar strand of argument emphasizes the 
discovery of foreign demand (Vettas, 2000). Making a 
new product for export markets may reveal to domestic 
producers that there is demand in international markets 
for products that can be (or already are being) produced 
domestically.1 In fact, the introduction of a new good 
may create demand abroad for that good by making 
consumers aware of its existence and characteristics. 
Like cost discoveries, demand discoveries represent 
non-patentable innovations and, as such, can be easily 
copied. Again, there is an important externality here 
that can lead to a sustained spurt of growth. 
A further development in the literature is the 
demonstration that producing a new export can have 
additional growth-enhancing effects. Export discoveries 
are not random, but follow some kind of sequence. 
Countries that become good at producing a particular 
export are likely to develop comparative advantages in 
related sectors. It has been observed that new exports 
cluster together or follow a pattern in time, examples 
being television sets, digital versatile discs (dvds) and 
mobile phones in China, different varieties of fruit 
in Chile and different kinds of wearing apparel in 
East Asia and Central America. This phenomenon 
can be explained by the observation that clusters of 
goods tend to utilize the same or similar public goods 
(specific public institutions) and non-tradable inputs 
(roads, logistical services). Hence, an export discovery 
may facilitate the emergence of other new exports 
in the same or closely related sectors. This being 
1 A case in point is wine in Chile. While wine has been produced 
there since the seventeenth century, it was not until the mid-1980s 
that exports took off, mainly because a few entrepreneurs discovered 
that, with some modifications to production techniques, Chilean 
wine could be sold very profitably in Europe (Agosin and Bravo-
Ortega, 2007).
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The purpose of this model is to attempt to capture 
these stylized facts. In a sense, it seeks to flesh out 
the classic view of development as resulting from the 
“advantages of backwardness” (Gerschenkron, 1962). 
In other words, technologically backward economies 
can grow at fast rates simply by copying what already 
exists elsewhere and do not have to grow by pushing 
out the technology frontier.2 Some countries are able 
to reap the advantages of being inside the technology 
frontier, either because of the policies they apply or 
because institutional arrangements are favourable; 
others are not. However, introducing goods that 
exist elsewhere is an innovation that can easily be 
copied. Indeed, it is precisely this that provides the 
impetus for rapid economic growth. The inability to 
reap discovery benefits is also the key market failure 
that needs to be dealt with if  an economy with these 
characteristics is to grow.
There is no aggregate production function and 
no technical change other than those embodied in the 
introduction of newer and more sophisticated goods. 
Aggregate output is the sum of the production value of 
all goods produced in the economy. Let us begin with 
an economy that produces one traditional good (say, 
sugar) using land and labour. Sugar is the numeraire 
of our economy (its price is unity). The introduction of 
any new good is the product of an idea, in the sense of 
“self-discovery” as the term is used by Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003); in order to be profitable, any new idea 
requires the existence of sector-specific public goods 
(“infrastructure” for short). Thus, economic growth 
in a developing-country setting is hampered by an 
informational externality (since those who introduce 
a new idea are unable to reap all its benefits) and by 
2 This is why calculating total factor productivity in developing 
economies makes so little sense. 
a coordination problem (since without the requisite 
infrastructure new ideas cannot be profitable).
Following Romer (1993), aggregate production 
is the sum of all goods produced. Let us assume that 
factor endowment consists of land (T ), unskilled labour 
(L) and initial human capital (H0). Sugar production 
uses land and labour but not human capital; all modern 
goods use labour and human capital but not land. 
There is an unlimited supply of unskilled labour, in 
the sense of Lewis (1954), so that we do not have to 
worry about running up against a labour shortage, 
and the wage is fixed at its subsistence level (w).
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For a product Gij to be generating output, the 
economy must have the supporting infrastructure
(Bj = 1). This is a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
The sufficient condition is that an entrepreneur must 
be using the idea (Aij = 1). If  the sector-specific 
infrastructure is not in place, there cannot be any 
production (Aij = 0). Investment in infrastructure in 
this model is a public-sector decision. Growth takes 
place through the introduction of  new goods or 
through investment in existing non-traditional goods. 
We assume that sugar production does not increase.3 
3 An alternative assumption is that sugar production grows at the 
rate of world demand, i.e., at the rate of growth of world output 
multiplied by the income elasticity of demand, which is usually 
much lower than unity.
the case, an export discovery has not only positive 
intra-industry growth effects but also inter-industry 
spillovers (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007; Hausmann 
and Rodrik, 2006).
These hypotheses suggest that export diversification 
should indeed be associated with economic growth, 
with export diversification the cause and economic 
growth the effect. 
III
A model linking output and export
diversification to growth
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This model captures the essentials of the experience 
of countries as different as the Republic of Korea 
(Amsden, 1989), Taiwan Province of China (Wade, 
1990), Mauritius (Wellisz and Lam Shin Saw, 1993), 
Finland (Jäntti, Saari and Vartiainen, 2005) and Chile 
(Agosin, 1999; Agosin and Bravo-Ortega, 2007). 
Human capital (other than the initial endowment) 
is on-the-job training. There is no firm-specific human 
capital. In other words, trained workers can migrate 
without any retraining costs to other modern sectors 
of the economy. Existing trained workers train others. 
Hence, the increase in human capital in any given 
period is proportional to the initial endowment plus the 
human capital that is employed in the modern sector 
of the economy. The economy may also import human 
capital through foreign direct investment.4 Formally, 
some of the products (Gij) may bring with them the 
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New ideas are the key to growth in this economy. 
Because many new ideas are variations on existing 
ones, new ideas (and new production sectors) are a 
function of the number of ideas being exploited in the 
economy (Anm) and of the stock of human capital.
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The public sector builds sector-specific 
infrastructure that enables the introduction of new 
ideas. We make the following assumptions: (i) the public 
sector balances its budget, (ii) all revenues come from 
taxing profits generated both in the modern sectors and 
in sugar production, (iii) government expenditures are 
either on investments in new infrastructure projects 
or in consumption (CG) and (iv) the cost of  each 
infrastructure project is the same (and equal to λ). 
From the condition of public-sector budget balance, 




4 This is one of the roles assigned by Romer (1993) to foreign direct 
investment in his original formulation of the model. 
In this model, new infrastructure projects generate 
growth. However, since they must be financed out 
of  tax revenue and the tax rate decreases the net 
profits of enterprises in the modern sector, there is 
a trade-off  between new infrastructure projects and 
investment by existing firms in the modern sector, since 
investment is financed from retained earnings.5 We 
assume that in the modern sector, aftertax profits are 
fully reinvested in existing ventures. Aftertax profits 
in sugar are consumed.
When will a new product be introduced into the 
economy? Assume that a prospective entrepreneur 
borrows C0 in period 0 to gather information about 
introducing a new idea into the economy. The 
entrepreneur also knows that capital of C1 is needed 
to make the project operational and will borrow this 
in period 1 if  and only if  the project indeed turns 
out to be profitable after the requisite information 
has been obtained. The project yields a profit of πij 
in period 2, but in period 1 the information needed 
to ensure the project is profitable becomes known to 
all potential entrepreneurs.6
Formally, and assuming risk neutrality, the 
entrepreneur will decide to gather information about 
the project if  expected aftertax profits in period 2 
exceed the search costs in period 0 and the capital 
investment costs in period 1:
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 10
2
1− ≥ + + + + +τ π ϕ ϕE C r C rij  (5)
where r is the international interest rate and φ the 
country risk premium. Alternatively, r can be interpreted 
as the bank deposit rate and φ as the spread between 
borrowing and lending rates. 
If  expected profits are normally distributed, 
with a sufficiently large number of  draws, average 
realized profits will be equal to expected profits. All 
entrepreneurs draw their information from the same 
pool. Some will wind up with profits that satisfy (5) 
and some will not. 
5 As will be seen below, we have made the simplifying assumption 
that there is no capital in this economy and that new production 
requires an advance (say, to hire skilled and unskilled workers) 
which is repaid in the following period. For pioneers, there is an 
additional investment in information-gathering. 
6 This is a somewhat different setup from the one used by Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2003). Their model requires a period of monopoly 
so that the innovator can reap a rent. We require only that the 
prospective profits of the project be sufficient to at least cover the 
costs of searching and setting up production.
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The situation of a copycat investor is much more 
favourable, since he or she can wait to observe which 
projects are profitable. For a copycat investor, the 
condition for making an investment in a sector Aij 
which turns out to be profitable is:
 ( ) ( )1 11− ≥ + +τ π ϕij C r
 (6)
This implies that it pays to wait for others to 
make the self-discovery, which means that there will 
be suboptimal investment in discoveries.
Discoveries can be of  two types. One has 
already been highlighted by Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2003): the discovery of  costs, which is related to 
information on input-output coefficients in the sector. 
For simplicity, we assume that these coefficients are 
fixed. Formally, a cost-discovery problem tells us 
that the entrepreneur must form an expectation with 
regard to these coefficients which ex post may or may 
not take their ex ante expected values. Simplifying 
the notation by eliminating subscripts and making
C C r C r= + + + + +0
2
11 1( ) ( ) :ϕ ϕ
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )]1 1− = − − − ≥τ π τE p wE l sE h G C  (7) 
The maximum levels of l,h that yield a positive 
profit higher than the value of the investment C can 
be mapped by converting (9) into an equality. An 
investment will be made if  the combined values of 
l and h are such that they are within the triangle in 
figure 1, where C p C G= − −/ [ ( )]1 τ :7
If the entrepreneur draws input-output coefficients 
which do not fall within the triangle, the investment will 
not be profitable. In addition, since each entrepreneur 
is small, she does not take into account the effect 
of  her investment on the skilled labour wage rate. 
However, one of  the effects of  cost discovery will 
be that investments by copycats push up this wage, 
reducing ex post the return on capital for the pioneer 
investor. An increase in the skilled labour wage will 
result in an inward movement within the input-output 
frontier, but only on the h axis, as described by the 
dotted line in figure 1.
In addition, under certain circumstances, if  the 
country’s producers as a group face a downward-
7 For the problem to have a sensible solution, must be positive 
C / w, C / s.
sloping demand curve, the product price may fall.8 
In this case the entire input-output frontier will move 
inward towards the origin. If the tax rate increases, the 
input-output frontier will also move inward, making 
investment in discovery less likely.
But, as noted above, there is another kind of 
discovery: demand discovery. Entrepreneurs may 
know the cost structure of a particular good but be 
uncertain as to whether they can sell it abroad. Once a 
market for the product has been created abroad, other 
producers can take advantage of the discovery without 
incurring the costs of opening up the market. In this 
case, the investment decision will look like this:
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ]1 1− = − − − ≥τ π τE E p wl sh G C  (8)
In this case, there is a minimum price that makes 
the venture profitable, and that happens when the 
equality in (8) holds. As copycats enter the market for 
the discovered product, the skilled labour wage will be 
bid up and the product price may fall. In equilibrium, 
this will reduce the profits of pioneer and copycats 
alike and discourage discoveries.
We have thus seen that the actions of followers 
erode the profits of the pioneer, either by raising factor 
rewards or by reducing the product price. However, 
the source of the market failure remains the same: 
8 This is a far from hypothetical case. In Chile, the discovery of kiwis 
as an export product in the 1970s led in a few years to a collapse 
in the international price from which domestic producers did not 





    hC / s
C / w l = – (s/w) h + (C/w) 
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the pioneer takes risks that, if  successful, result in 
easier profits for others. Therefore, it pays to wait 
for others to make the discoveries, and the supply of 
self-discovery will be suboptimal.
This model has interesting properties. When only 
sugar production exists, the potential for opening 
up new sectors is restricted to the resources the 
government can extract from taxing sugar profits, 
which are anyway not reinvested. Therefore, there 
might be a good argument for squeezing profits in 
the traditional sector, which (in the model) would 
have the result of lowering consumption and raising 
investment in infrastructure specific to other (new) 
sectors of the economy. At any rate, the potential for 
the introduction of new products into the economy is 
limited by the narrow tax base. As the tax base widens 
with the opening up of new sectors, the government 
is able to finance new infrastructure projects, thus 
accelerating growth. There is, nonetheless, a trade-off  
between building new infrastructure and opening up 
new sectors and investment by the private sector in 
the existing modern sectors. 
Human capital formation is the consequence 
of new ideas being introduced and existing skilled 
workers training unskilled workers. A high rate of 
investment in human capital (with the effect of raising 
μ, in our model) can ease the pressure on the skilled 
labour wage that is a consequence of  investment 
in the modern sector and of the discovery of new 
products. In addition, the higher the rate of human 
capital accumulation, the higher will be the rate of 
new discoveries.
In this model, government has three roles: investing 
in infrastructure specific to sectors that do not yet 
exist, which makes discovery possible; subsidizing the 
cost of discovery, in light of the informational market 
failure involved; and raising the rate of skill formation 
(presumably by raising the value of μ).9 As already noted, 
it should balance the need for public investment with 
the drag of taxes on modern-sector investment, which 
is financed largely out of retained earnings.10
The model can account for several of  the 
constraints on growth discussed in the literature and 
can be used to illustrate the decision-tree approach to 
the issue employed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 
(2005). For example, growth can be constrained by 
a high cost of finance. This would be reflected in an 
interest-rate spread (φ) that would raise the threshold 
for the expected profits required for self-discovery 
activities.11 The economy may not be generating 
enough growth through discovery because of  low 
appropriability of returns to discovery. This could be 
the case if the tax rate is too high, as this would reduce 
the rate of return to investments in new products.12 
While taxes finance infrastructure investment, they 
can also finance consumption. The rate of new skill 
formation may be too low to prevent the wages of 
skilled labour from rising to levels where they choke 
off  investment. This would be reflected in a low μ in 
equation (2). 
These considerations may explain why successful 
countries are able to grow faster than others: they 
may subsidize discovery activities in various ways; 
they may keep borrowing costs low, either through 
policies that deepen financial markets or by directing 
credits to winners (see Amsden, 1989, for the Korean 
experience); they may use government revenue for 
investment rather than consumption; they may keep tax 
rates reasonable; or they may invest in human capital 
accumulation. Most of the successful countries of 
Asia have done some or all of these things, but Latin 
American countries have failed to do enough of them 
to ensure an adequate rate of self-discovery.
10 We are assuming that investment in existing modern sectors is 
financed out of retained earnings, but that the funds required to 
set up a new sector are borrowed.
11 If  non-availability of credit for new projects is the problem, then 
φ is in effect infinite.
12 Remember that taxes on sugar profits do not matter because these 
are consumed, but if  taxes were high they would affect profits on 
both traditional and new products. Taxation on the latter discourages 
investment by reducing the appropriability of returns.
9 The costs of  the last two have not been factored into the 
model.
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In this section, we show the plausibility of  the 
hypothesis linking export diversification and growth 
by looking at the recent experience of  East Asia 
and Latin America and the Caribbean. As shown in 
table 1, Asian exporters of manufactures grew much 
faster during 1981-2003 than Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Asian output and exports grew more 
than twice as fast as those of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Even if  one excludes the 1980s, the “lost 
decade” in the latter region, these differences also 
apply to the period since 1990, although average Asian 
output and export growth rates are not quite double 
those of Latin America and the Caribbean. Figure 2 
shows that these averages are not a statistical fluke, 
since the same pattern repeats itself  at the country 
level: all Asian countries exhibit higher rates of 
growth in both gdp and exports. Even during the 
1991-2003 period, the country with the highest rate 
of gdp growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Chile) was surpassed by five of the ten Asian countries 
included in the sample.
What is interesting about these figures is that 
both gdp and exports consistently grew faster in 
the Asian countries than in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In fact, the ratio of gdp growth to export 
growth is practically identical in the two regions for 
the two periods analysed but, as argued below, Asian 
countries’ exports not only grew faster but were also 
of higher “quality”; that is, they were considerably 
more diversified. 
Of course, this does not mean that faster export 
growth is the key to the success of the Asian countries 
relative to their Latin American counterparts, since 
there are many other differences between them, but 
13 The 2004-2007 period was affected by the unprecedented rise in 
primary commodity prices, which undoubtedly raised the Herfindahl-
IV
Trade and growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and Asia, 1980-200313
TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia (selected countries):
gdp and export growth, 1981-2003
(Percentage annual change in gdp and real exports of goods and services)
 1981-2003 1991-2003
 gdp Exports gdp Exports
Growth rates
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.4 5.3 3.0 6.2
Asia 5.9 11.1 5.5 11.7
Ratio of  gdp to export elasticity
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.49 0.45
Asia 0.47 0.53
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.
org/dataonline/.
N.B.: Exports refer to real exports of goods and services (nominal values deflated by the relevant gdp deflator). Countries included are: 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of  Bolivia 
and Uruguay; in Asia, Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong (sar), India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of  Korea, Thailand 
and Vietnam.
Hirschmann coefficients of Latin America to levels considerably 
higher than those considered “normal” for the region.
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faster export growth, more diversified exports and the 
factors that underlie these phenomena do appear to 
have played a role.
There is evidence that output and export 
diversification has been a trait in the development 
pattern of  Asia. The proxy for output and export 
diversification that we use here is the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (hhi),14 taken from the Handbook 
of Trade and Development Statistics of  the United 
Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(unctad) and measured at the three-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (sitc) level. 
However imperfectly, this indicator captures both 
vertical and horizontal diversification. By vertical 
diversification is meant the shift from exporting, say, 
primary commodities to exporting manufactures. 
Horizontal diversification means broadening the 
export basket by diversifying into goods within the 
same broad category; for example, from grapes with 
seeds to seedless grapes, or from coffee for the mass 
market to gourmet coffee.
As can be seen from table 2, in 1980 Asian 
countries had a much lower hhi on average than 
Latin America and the Caribbean; during the period 
up to 2002 the index declined consistently in all Asian 
countries, with the exceptions of  Taiwan Province 
of China and the Republic of Korea, where the hhi 
bottomed out in 1992.15 However, in 2002 these two 
latter economies had a lower hhi than most of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Indonesia, a country 
whose exports were dominated by oil in 1980, saw 
a dramatic fall in its hhi over the 1980-2002 period, 
from 0.53 to 0.12. China too, even after starting out 
15 These two economies have the highest per capita incomes in 
the entire sample of  middle-income countries, Asian or Latin 
American. In fact, the International Monetary Fund classifies them 
as developed economies. Perhaps the rise in the hhi is evidence of 
the U-shaped relationship between industrial concentration and 
income levels found by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003).
FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia (selected countries): growth of gdp 
and of goods and services exports, 1991-2003
(Percentage average annual rates of growth)
Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.
org/dataonline/.
N.B.: Country abbreviations are as follows: in Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina (ar), Plurinational State of  Bolivia (bo), 
Brazil (br), Chile (ch), Colombia (co), Costa Rica (cr), Dominican Republic (dr), Ecuador (ec), El Salvador (es), Guatemala 
(gu), Honduras (ho), Mexico (me), Nicaragua (ni), Paraguay (pa), Peru (pe), Panama (pn), Uruguay (ur) and Bolivarian Republic 
of  Venezuela (ve); in Asia, Bangladesh (ba), China (chi), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hk), India (in), Indonesia 
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= ∑ ( )2 ,  where xij is the value of exports of good i by country
j and xj represents the total value of exports from country j.
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with a relatively low hhi in 1986, experienced a large 
decline to less than 0.10, the kind of level observed 
in most developed countries. Most Asian exporters 
of manufactures are rapidly approaching hhi levels 
very similar to those of developed countries.
Several Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have been diversifying their exports. Particularly 
impressive has been the decline in the hhi of Mexico, 
Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Chile. Argentina 
maintained a low hhi for the entire 1980-2002 period, 
but its exports remain more concentrated than those 
of Asian manufacturing exporters.
Practically the same picture emerges if  one looks 
at the number of goods exported, also at the sitc 
three-digit level (see table 3). The maximum number of 
positions in the three-digit sitc is 239 and practically 
all Asian countries are fast approaching that number. 
While an increase in the number of goods exported 
can also be seen in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
it has been more modest, so that the average remains 
at about half  the maximum.16
TABLE 2
Latin America (selected countries) and Asian exporters of manufactures:
Herfindahl-Hirschmann export concentration index, 1980-2002
 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002
Latin Americaa 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.26 0.25
 Argentina 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.39 0.52 0.32 0.20 0.25
 Brazil 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09
 Chile 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.27
 Colombia 0.58 0.58 0.24 0.25 0.22
 Costa Rica 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.19 0.21
 Ecuador 0.55 0.45 0.47 0.35 0.39
 El Salvador 0.38 0.71 0.24 0.24 0.13
 Guatemala 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.24 0.19
 Honduras 0.37 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.20
 Mexico 0.48 0.27 0.15 0.11 0.13
 Nicaragua 0.37 0.52 0.29 0.32 0.18
 Panama 0.26 0.37 0.45 0.30 0.31
 Paraguay 0.28 0.40 0.36 0.43 0.38
 Peru 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.25
 Uruguay 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.19
 Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.67 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.75
Asian exporters of manufacturesa 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.14
 China … 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.09
 Hong Kong (sar) 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.12
 Taiwan Province of  China 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.15
 India 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13
 Indonesia 0.53 0.34 0.19 0.16 0.12
 Republic of  Korea 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.15
 Malaysia 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.22
 Thailand 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.11 …
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Handbook of Trade and Development Statistics, Geneva.
a Unweighted average of countries shown.
16 A curiosity of the data is that the number of products exported 
by most Latin American countries actually declined during the 
first half  of the 1980s. This could have been another effect of the 
debt crisis.
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The portfolio effect of output and export diversification 
on growth should mean that export diversification is 
associated with faster growth. If the portfolio effect 
were indeed at work, the causal relationships would be 
those summarized in figure 3. Export diversification 
is related positively to growth because of its effect in 
reducing the variance of export and gdp growth. As 
already stated, a reduction in the volatility of gdp growth 
should have a positive effect on growth itself.
These hypotheses are not falsified by the data 
available for the 1980-2003 period. Figure 3 would 
lead one to expect a negative correlation between 
export diversification and the variance of  export 
growth, a positive correlation between the variance 
of export growth and the variance of gdp growth, 
and a negative correlation between the variance of 
gdp growth and the rate of gdp growth.17
17 Part of the effect of high gdp volatility on the gdp growth rate 
could be due to the impact of volatility on investment. High gdp 
volatility can be expected to lead to low rates of investment, with 
low investment being the cause of slow growth.
TABLE 3
Latin America (selected countries) and Asian exporters of manufactures:
number of goods exported, 1980-2002
(At the three-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification)
 1980 1986 1992 1998 2002
Latin Americaa 141 112 142 163 169
 Argentina 198 201 211 221 220
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 47 42 82 119 130
 Brazil 225 213 219 222 225
 Chile 181 147 195 209 201
 Colombia 162 149 189 197 201
 Costa Rica 144 113 142 179 175
 Ecuador 80 53 116 148 151
 El Salvador 116 86 113 149 164
 Guatemala 168 121 137 167 168
 Honduras 99 56 90 120 131
 Mexico 201 208 221 229 229
 Nicaragua 97 41 63 86 137
 Panama 136 64 75 88 120
 Paraguay 63 24 61 90 94
 Peru 176 135 162 187 190
 Uruguay 156 130 149 166 150
 Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 153 128 193 196 194
Asian exporters of manufacturesa 189 182 212 217 225
 China … 90 233 232 233
 Hong Kong (sar) 164 165 175 179 227
 Taiwan Province of  China 210 214 219 221 219
 India 211 205 214 222 227
 Indonesia 144 154 208 216 227
 Republic of  Korea 207 212 215 220 217
 Malaysia 214 217 222 227 224
 Thailand 176 197 211 222 …
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Handbook of Trade and Development Statistics, Geneva.
a Unweighted average of countries shown.
V
Evidence for the portfolio effect
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FIGURE 3
The portfolio effect of export diversification on growth, 1980-2003a
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/, and United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Handbook of Trade and Development Statistics, Geneva.
a The values of ρ represent the correlation coefficients between the variables in the two adjacent boxes. All are significant at the 1% 
level. The data used are for 106 countries over the 1980-2003 period. Export growth refers to goods and services in 2000 dollars. 




Export  growth variance
ρ = -0.406**
GDP  growth variance
GDP growth
This is precisely what the data show (see figure 3). 
All correlation coefficients are of the expected sign and 
are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Export 
diversification is measured as div = 1 – hhi. Increases in 
div are highly correlated with declines in the variance 
of export growth. In turn, a lower variance of export 
growth is highly correlated with a lower variance of 
gdp growth. Lastly, a lower variance of gdp growth is 
strongly associated with higher gdp growth.
These simple correlations do not amount to 
proof of the portfolio effect, but they do suggest that 
something like it may indeed be at work.
VI
Growth empirics: does export
diversification add anything?
In this section, we explore whether export diversification 
has any explanatory power in a parsimonious empirical 
model of growth. Two different variables, proxies for 
output and export diversification, were tested. One 
was div by itself, while the other was diversification-
weighted per capita export growth; in other words, div 
interacting with per capita export growth (rx*div). 
As will be noted below, while div has the correct sign 
and is highly significant, it is the interactive variable 
that has the most explanatory power. The intuition 
behind the inclusion of  this interactive variable is 
that diversification is more powerful when a country’s 
exports are growing rapidly than just by itself. Note 
the difference between Colombia and Malaysia: both 
wind up in 2002 with a div of  0.78 (hhi of  0.22), 
but Malaysia’s exports grew at a rate of 10.7% in the 
1980-2003 period, while Colombia’s grew only at an 
average rate of  5.7%. Diversification-weighted per 
capita exports in Malaysia grew at an annual rate of 
5.9%, while those of Colombia grew by only 2.5% a 
year. gdp growth averaged 6.4% in Malaysia but only 
3.1% in Colombia.
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The estimation strategy is to add div and rx*div 
to an otherwise standard empirical model of  per 
capita growth. The variables considered were initial 
gdp per capita, initial openness (trade as a percentage 
of gdp), average fixed capital formation during the 
period, and the rule of law index from the database 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003).18 The model is estimated by ordinary least 
18 A host of different controls were also used, including the average 
years of schooling in the population aged 15 to 64, but they were 
not found to add anything to the equation.
squares (ols) and by instrumental variables (iv). This 
latter technique is used to correct possible simultaneity 
biases stemming from the endogeneity of the growth 
rate, export diversification and the investment rate. The 
instruments used for the investment rate and for div 
and rx*div were manufactures as a share of exports, 
population size and the rule of law index.
The most suggestive results of the exercise are 
shown in table 4. In equations (1) and (2), we control 
only for initial gdp per capita and openness. div and 
rx*div are of the correct sign and highly significant 
when entered individually into the regression. The 
inclusion of both div and rx*div in an equation (not 
TABLE 4
An empirical model of growth
(Dependent variable: average annual rate of per capita gdp growth, 1980-2003)
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 ols iv ols iv ols iv ols iv
log ypc80 -0.102 -0.366 -0.014 -0.080 -0.800 -0.717 -0.683 -0.581
 (-0.87) (-2.57)* (-0.16) (-0.72) (-6.99)** (-5.41)** (-5.94)** (-3.92)**
trade80 0.006 0.014 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.003
 (1.51)  (1.62) (1.68)+ (-0.44) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.83)
i/y     0.192 0.249 0.159 0.119 
     (9.12)** (4.88)** (6.49)** (3.09)**
rl     1.345 0.949 1.198 0.911 
     (7.30)** (3.48)** (6.41)** (3.53)**
div 4.646 12.147   2.309 5.05
 (5.12)** (4.71)**   (3.59)** (2.92)**
rx*div   0.326 0.465   0.176 0.312
   (9.37)** (9.26)**   (5.43)** (5.65)**
Adj. R2 0.165 - 0.427 0.365 0.655 0.608 0.677 0.640
No. of  observations 124 118 118 117 113 112 109 108
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/, except for the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index data, which are from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Handbook of Trade and 
Development Statistics, Geneva.
N.B.: Underlying gdp and export data are in constant 2000 dollars. Exports refer to goods and services. The rule of  law index is 
from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and was measured in 1996. Constant not shown; t ratios in parentheses; iv estimations 
with robust standard errors.
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Definition of  variables:
ypc80  = gdp per capita in 1980. 
trade80 = exports plus imports divided by gdp in 1980.
i/y = gross fixed capital formation (average for the period) as a share of  gdp.
rl = rule of  law index (1996).
div = export diversification index (1– hhi), average for the period (data end in 2002).
rx*div = diversification-weighted rate of  per capita export growth.
Instrumental variables used for div, rx*div and i/y: share of  manufactures in gdp, population size and rule of  law.
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shown) renders div not significantly different from 
zero, while the coefficient associated with rx*div 
remains almost unchanged and is still highly significant. 
Interestingly, the share of trade in initial gdp plays no 
role in explaining cross-country variations in per capita 
gdp growth rates. Neither is initial income per capita 
a robust explanatory variable, as the significance of 
the coefficient attached to this variable fluctuates quite 
sharply between model specifications and estimation 
techniques. As we shall see, this result is overturned 
when we add control variables to the model. 
Next, we introduce div and rx*div into a more 
completely specified model, one that includes gross 
fixed investment and the rule of law index. This is 
done in equations (3) and (4). It can be seen that this 
parsimonious model is statistically quite powerful. 
Initial gdp per capita becomes highly significant, the 
openness variable continues to have no role in the 
explanation of cross-country growth differences, and 
investment and the rule of law are both of the correct 
sign and also highly significant. These results confirm 
the finding in the literature that growth is positively 
related to investment, a hypothesis that goes back to the 
Harrod-Domar model and is also compatible with some 
of the more recent endogenous growth literature.19 The 
results also lend credence to the more recent emphasis 
on institutions as important determinants of growth. 
The rule of law (rl) is only as good as the capacity of 
governments to enforce it, and such capacity is likely 
to depend on a basic social pact. Other things being 
equal, countries where the government is perceived as 
working for the good of society as a whole are better 
able to enforce the rule of law, and this may explain the 
result that higher levels in rl are positively correlated 
with growth, and that the coefficient associated with 
rl is highly significant.
Both the variables that attempt to capture output 
and export diversification (div and rx*div) are highly 
significant, the interactive variable more so than div. 
Note that the model explains between 60% and two 
thirds of the cross-country variation in per capita gdp 
growth rates. Instrumental variable estimations raise 
the value of the coefficients attached to diversification 
and diversification-weighted per capita export growth. 
In equation (3), the coefficient of  div doubles. In 
equation (4), the coefficient of rx*div rises just shy 
of 100%. At the same time, the coefficients of the 
other variables remain more or less stable when we 
go from ols to iv estimations. This would seem to 
support the notion that export diversification, in 
either of its two formulations, has indeed been an 
important contributor to the differences in growth 
performance between Asia and Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
VII
Growth differentials: how much does output
and export diversification explain?
Even if  the coefficients attached to our proxies of 
output and export diversification are statistically 
significant, they may not add much to the explanation 
of  growth differentials. Through a simple exercise 
using the regional average values of div, rx*div, i/y 
and rl, we can show that our two output and export 
diversification variables do explain a quantitatively 
important share of the difference in growth performance 
between exporters of manufactures in Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
First let us look at what the data for our main 
variables tell us about these variables that purportedly 
explain differences in growth performance. As can 
be seen in table 5, the rate of per capita gdp growth 
was quite robust in the Asian high performers, but 
very modest in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Asia has done better than Latin America and the 
Caribbean in all explanatory factors, but two stand 
out: investment rates are almost 9 percentage points 
of gdp higher in Asia, and average diversification-
weighted per capita export growth is 6.7 percentage 
19 Ironically, the profession rediscovered Harrod-Domar in the guise 
of the ak model. Since economists do not have much historical 
memory, however, nobody has remarked that the ak model is 
nothing other than the Harrod-Domar model in a new guise. Since 
much of the growth in productivity in developing countries comes 
embodied in imported machinery, the importance of investment 
is likely to be even greater for this group of countries than for 
developed economies.
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points higher. This latter difference arises out of the 
fact that exports are considerably more diversified in 
Asia than in Latin America and the Caribbean and, 
moreover, have grown faster.
Armed with these data, we undertook a simple 
calculation of the extent to which each of the three 
factors identified above (investment, the rule of law 
and export diversification) help to explain growth 
differentials between Latin America and the Caribbean 
and the fast growers of Asia. The results are shown in 
table 6. About 80% of the difference in growth rates is 
explained by differences in investment rates, the rule of 
law and export diversification. Using the coefficients of 
equation (3) in table 4 (iv estimation), the main factor 
explaining growth differences turns out to be investment, 
with export diversification adding a not insignificant 
0.7 percentage points to the superior Asian growth 
performance. When we use the coefficients of equation 
(4), diversification-weighted per capita export growth 
becomes the most important factor explaining growth 
differences. This factor by itself  explains almost 50% 
of the difference in growth rates between fast-growing 
Asian exporters of manufactures and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. We take this to be evidence that 
export growth, in the context of diversification, is the 
variable pulling gdp growth and investment.
TABLE 5
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries) and fast-growing Asian countries: 
per capita gdp growth and some key factors explaining the difference, 1980-2003
(Percentages, except for rl and div indices)
Countries Per capita gdp growth rate i/y rl  div rx*div
Latin America 0.4 20.2 -0.27 0.71 1.9
 Argentina 0.3 18.1 0.28 0.86 3.4
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) -0.2 16.0 -0.66 0.73 1.3
 Brazil 0.8 20.8 -0.26 0.90 5.2
 Chile 3.5 21.7 1.26 0.69 4.3
 Colombia 1.1 19.0 -1.04 0.70 2.5
 Costa Rica 1.2 22.2 0.64 0.71 3.2
 Ecuador 0.3 21.1 -0.39 0.58 2.0
 El Salvador 0.0 15.3 -0.48 0.69 1.5
 Guatemala 0.0 15.0 -0.64 0.75 -0.5
 Honduras -0.1 25.1 -0.85 0.62 -1.2
 Mexico 1.0 22.4 -0.12 0.82 6.5
 Nicaragua -1.3 23.9 -0.68 0.71 0.1
 Panama 1.4 21.0 -0.68 0.66 -0.1
 Paraguay 0.1 24.0 -0.50 0.62 1.5
 Peru 0.1 22.6 -0.35 0.75 1.7
 Uruguay 0.1 14.7 0.53 0.81 3.0
 Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) -1.1 21.2 -0.66 0.41 -0.1
Asian exporters of manufactures 4.8 29.0 0.32 0.85 8.6
 China 8.2 36.0 -0.45 0.92 18.1
 Hong Kong (sar) 4.0 28.3 1.71 0.84 8.2
 India 3.8 22.6 -0.01 0.86 6.6
 Indonesia 3.7 26.8 -0.36 0.80 2.3
 Republic of  Korea 5.6 32.4 0.81 0.87 10.0
 Malaysia 3.6 30.7 0.85 0.80 5.9
 Thailand 4.7 31.4 0.49 0.89 3.0
 Vietnam 4.7 23.6 -0.50 0.78 15.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/, except for the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index data, which are from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Handbook of Trade and 
Development Statistics, Geneva.
N.B.: Underlying gdp and export data are in constant 2000 dollars. Exports refer to goods and services. The rule of  law index is 
from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and was measured in 1996.
Definition of  variables:
i/y = gross fixed capital formation (average for the period) as a share of  gdp.
rl = rule of  law index (1996).
div = export diversification index (1– hhi), average for the period (data end in 2002).
rx*div = diversification-weighted rate of  per capita export growth.
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VIII
Conclusions
This paper has developed a theoretical model that 
attempts to capture the stylized facts of growth in 
economies that do not themselves innovate but catch up 
with the technological frontier by adding new activities 
to their production and export structures. The model 
suggests that export diversification, insofar as it is 
symptomatic of broadening comparative advantage, 
is the key to economic growth.
The empirical sections of the paper show that 
export diversification is indeed associated with higher 
economic growth. We speculate that there are two 
channels through which diversified export growth 
stimulates output growth. One of  them we have 
called the portfolio effect. Diversification of exports 
leads to less export volatility, which in turn results 
in lowered output volatility. Countries with highly 
unstable economies grow more slowly than countries 
that exhibit more dampened cyclical fluctuations. The 
data do not contradict this chain of reasoning.
The second effect concerns the dynamic benefits 
associated with successful efforts to diversify 
comparative advantages, with learning and information 
externalities paramount among them. Our results are 
complementary to the recent findings of Hausmann 
and Klinger (2007) that a country’s export pattern 
is a good predictor of future growth. Countries that 
export products associated with the export profile 
of high-income countries tend to converge rapidly 
towards those higher levels of income and, hence, to 
grow more rapidly. We would add that low-income 
countries generally have comparative advantages 
in few goods or, not unusually, just one. Efforts to 
diversify away from their traditional comparative 
advantage are likely to get the growth process started. 
It is only through output and export diversification 
that the spillovers of new exports can begin. These 
spillovers can be horizontal or vertical. Any new 
export produces information that is useful to other 
potential entrants into the industry. The emergence 
of a new sector facilitates the appearance of other 
sectors that utilize the same non-tradable inputs or 
public goods.
The empirical results are congruent with this 
model. In a cross-country econometric model of 
growth, the proxies for output and export diversification 
used (both the degree of export diversification and 
the interaction between per capita export growth and 
export diversification) are highly significant and make 
an important contribution to explaining variations in 
growth rates across countries.
The empirical model shows that variables other 
than export diversification also play a role in explaining 
TABLE 6
Latin America and Asian exporters of manufactures:
explaining the difference in growth ratesa
(Percentages)
 Calculation I Calculation II
Growth differential 4.4 4.4
Contribution of:  
 Investment 2.2 1.0
 Rule of  law 0.6 0.5
 Export diversification 0.7 
 Diversification-weighted per capita export growth  2.1
Total of above factors 3.5 3.6
Source: results in table 4 and data in table 5.
a In calculation I, the coefficients of equation (3, iv) were used; calculation II is based on the coefficients of equation (4, iv).
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20 However, investment and export diversification are not so 
highly correlated that their joint inclusion in the econometric 
model renders one of them not significant. In fact, the coefficient 
of the diversification variable is quite robust to the introduction 
of investment.
differences in economic growth between countries. 
Investment certainly takes pride of place. It has already 
been noted that the dynamic Asian economies have 
investment rates considerably higher than those of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The 
strength of  investment could well be associated 
with export growth and diversification: the more 
diversified an economy is, the greater the likelihood 
that there will be profitable investment opportunities. 
In addition, where there is vigorous self-discovery 
there will also be vigorous investment. Finally, the 
more diversified exports are, the stronger will be the 
linkages between some exporting activities and the 
rest of  the economy.20 In our empirical model, when 
diversification-weighted export growth is introduced as 
an explanatory variable, the quantitative importance of 
investment declines sharply. This may very well be an 
indication that rapid export growth cum diversification 
is a powerful incentive to investment.
(Original: English)
Bibliography
Agosin, M.R. (2007), “Trade and growth: why Asia grows faster 
than Latin America”, Growth with Equity in Latin America, 
R. Ffrench-Davis and J.L. Machinea (eds.), Basingstoke, 
Palgrave-Macmillan.
 (200(1999), “Trade and growth in Chile”, cepal Review, 
No. 68 (LC/G.2039-P), Santiago, Chile, August.
Agosin, M.R. and C. Bravo-Ortega (2007), The Emergence of 
New Successful Export Activities in Chile, Washington, D.C., 
Inter-American Development Bank.
Amsden, A. (1989), Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late 
Industrialization, New York, Oxford University Press.
Gerschenkron, A. (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press.
Hausmann, R. and D. Rodrik (2006), Doomed to Choose: Industrial 
Policy as Predicament, Cambridge, Massachusetts, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
 (200(2003), “Economic development as self-discovery”, 
Journal of  Development Economics, vol. 72, No. 2, 
Amsterdam, Elsevier.
Hausmann, R., D. Rodrik and A. Velasco (2005), Growth 
Diagnostics, Cambridge, Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, unpublished.
Hausmann, R. and B. Klinger (2007), “The structure of  the 
product space and the evolution of comparative advantage”, 
cid Working Paper, No. 146, Center of  International 
Development, Harvard University, April.
Imbs, J. and R. Wacziarg (2003), “Stages of  diversification”, 
American Economic Review, vol. 93, No. 1, Nashville, 
Tennessee, American Economic Association.
Jäntti, M., J. Saari and J. Vartiainen (2005), “Country case 
study: Finland. Combining growth with equity”, document 
presented at the wider Jubilee Conference (Helsinki, 16-17 
June 2005) [online] http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/
conference-2005-3/conference-2005-3.htm.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2005), “Governance 
matters IV: governance indicators for 1996-2004”, World 
Bank Policy Working Paper, No. 3630, Washington, D.C., 
World Bank, May.
Lewis, W.A. (1954), Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies 
of Labour, Manchester, The Manchester School, May. 
Romer, P. (1993), “Two strategies for economic development: 
using ideas and producing ideas”, Proceedings of the World 
Bank on Development Economics 1992, Washington, D.C., 
World Bank.
Vettas, N. (2000), “Investment dynamics in markets with 
endogenous demands”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 
vol. 48, No. 2, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.
Wade, R. (1990), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and 
the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Wellisz, S. and P. Lam Shin Saw (1993), “Mauritius”, The Political 
Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: Five Small Open 
Economies, R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (eds.), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
